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2 February 1966

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept., JCS reviews completed

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

C O N T E N T S

1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
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3. Notes: Thailand; Singapore; Nigeria; Belgium. (Page 4)



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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: There have been no reports during the past 24 hours of significant developments in large allied operations currently under way in Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Phu Yen provinces.

South Vietnamese forces operating in Quang Tri Province yesterday skirmished with an estimated Viet Cong battalion during the day, but contact was apparently broken before a significant engagement developed. Resulting casualties were initially reported to be light on both sides.

After a flurry of Viet Cong attacks during the past several days, there were no reports of significant enemy activity yesterday.


Communist Political Developments: Hanoi quickly responded to the US effort to bring the Vietnam problem before the United Nations Security Council, declaring that all resolutions of the Security Council which interfere with the Vietnam problem are null and void. The Vietnam problem comes within the competence of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina and not the Security Council, said the Foreign Ministry statement.

The Soviet news agency TASS promptly reported Hanoi's opposition to UN involvement in the Vietnamese conflict. Russian Ambassador Federenko, in a speech at the UN on 1 February, predictably declared that he would oppose any Security Council action. Echoing the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry statement, Federenko criticized Washington's request for UN action as a diversionary tactic designed to hide plans to expand the war.

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[ Ghanaian President Nkrumah is planning to visit North Vietnam in late February in response to an invitation given him by Ho Chi Minh last summer. Prior to his departure, a delegation headed by Foreign Minister Alex Quaison-Sackey will go to Hanoi "to take a last minute reading on the situation." Nkrumah's projected trip to Hanoi last summer fell through when the North Vietnamese claimed they could not guarantee his safety because of US air attacks. ]



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Indonesia: [Rumors continue to circulate in Djakarta of President Sukarno's plans to strengthen his position vis-a-vis the army and anti-Communist elements.]

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[Sukarno now is planning to announce his long-awaited "political solution" on 5 February. This solution is intended to result in the reorganization of all political parties under "NASAKOM"--Sukarno's acronym for the fusion of nationalist, religious, and Communist factions. In preparation for the announcement, Sukarno [ ] directed certain elite military units in the Djakarta area to take their orders directly from the palace.]

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[Such a tactic would be designed to help restore Sukarno's former authority, undermine the anti-Communist campaign, and pave the way over the longer run for a resurgence of Communist influence. Sukarno, however, has been delaying any such firm "solution" apparently in the belief that his position can best be improved by a more gradual approach and the general passage of time. This strategy has indeed strengthened Sukarno's position during the past month, but not to the point where he seems willing to risk a direct confrontation with army leadership.] [ ]

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NOTES

Thailand: [The Thai Government has again indicated annoyance at US press reports concerning close Thai cooperation with US military actions in Laos and Vietnam. On 31 January Prime Minister Thanom told US Ambassador Martin that these reports were causing him difficulty in adhering to a policy of complete co-operation with the US. He also said that repetition of these reports in Communist radio broadcasts was endangering the stability of his government.]

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Singapore: Fighting broke out yesterday between Chinese and Malay army recruits in Singapore's first significant communal disturbance since the large-scale rioting of July and September 1964. The incident was confined to a military depot but could increase racial tension throughout the island. Antagonism between Chinese and Malays, heightened in recent years by political warfare between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, remains a major long-term threat to the stability of both Singapore and Malaysia.]

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Nigeria: General Ironsi's regime apparently is making plans to develop a governmental system with a stronger central authority than Nigeria has known since achieving independence in 1960. Several sources, including one of the regional military governors, have indicated that the present four semi-autonomous regions will be supplanted by a larger number of provinces responsible to Lagos under a unitary, rather than federal, structure. Such an arrangement is likely to be resisted by older traditional leaders, especially in the North.

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Belgium: Increasing labor unrest threatens to bring down the Catholic-Socialist coalition government. In the immediate crisis, the nation's doctors with Catholic support threaten to strike for higher fees and abolition of free treatment, while the Socialists line up with labor's opposition to the doctors' demands. In addition to this problem, riots protesting the closing of uneconomic northern coal mines have forced the government to send in troops to support the police. Even if the coalition survives these problems, it is likely to be preoccupied for the indefinite future with labor unrest and linguistic animosity at the expense of foreign policy decisions.

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

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